




In the field of consciousness things are posited as objective beings, with a 
self-conscious ego being set up opposite them as a subjective being. Things are 
then “reality” in the sense of entities external to us, although the very fact 
that they are external is owing to the standpoint of man’s consciousness. 
Things said to exist outside the subject are fundamentally (that is, episte­
mologically) still inside the compass of subjectivity. That something is an 
“object” means simply that it is objectivized, that it is represented as an 
object. That a thing exists objectively and lies beyond all conscious represent­
ation is only possible by its being represented as something beyond represent­
ation. It is a paradox essentially involved in representation (and hence in the 
“object” as well), and the aparia inherent in the very field of consciousness.
When the field of consciousness is broken through so as to open up nibilum 
at its base, and all things are so to speak “nihilized” and deprived of their 
“reality,” the subjective being makes this mbilum the field of self-emancipa­
tion and through this subjectivized nibilum becomes more authentically sub­
jective. Also, by saying that things are divested of the character of external 
reality, I do not mean they simply turn out to be illusions, rather that in their 
being divested of the character of external reality they simultaneously escape 
from the subjective, representative character that lies hidden behind what is
• This part concludes the translation of Chapter Three of SbiJfyo to va Namka (“What is 
Religion?”), Sobunsha, 1961. A translation of Chapeer One appeared in PbifotopbitalSntJitt 
ofjapoty Vol. 2; Chapter Twoin the Eastern Bttddbisf, Vol. IH, No. I & 2, the first two parts 
of Chapter Three appeared in the Eastern Baddhist, Vol. IV, No. 2 and Vol. V, No. I. 
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called external reality. They move a step further outside the paradox of re­
presentation just mentioned.
In the field ofnibilum things cease to be objects and as a result disclose them­
selves as the reality wholly beyond representation. “Wholly beyond repre­
sentation” here is diametrically opposed to the“ objective” existence of things 
that are hiddenly represented so as to appear external and beyond represent­
ation. While in the field of consciousness, reality that is “external” and inde­
pendent of representation arises only by way of representation, in the field of 
nibilumj where things are deprived of external reality as objects, they escape 
this representative character and reveal themselves in their own reality.
When the field of nibilum is opened up at the ground of both subject and 
object at once, when it appears from behind the relationship of subject and 
object, it always presents itself as a field that has been from the first there at 
the ground of that relationship.
What seems to make things and ourselves unreal in fact makes them more 
really emerge; as Heidegger says, “The being of beings reveals itself in the 
nihilization of nibilum ” The field of nibilum is thus the field where the sub­
ject becomes more authentically subjective, and at the same time things 
reveal themselves more in reality.
Then, if we advance further and turn aw ay even from that field of mhilum 
to the field of emptiness (if we, as was said before, go from a right-angle turn 
to a one hundred and eighty or even a complete three hundred and sixty de­
gree turn), in what mode of being do things disclose themselves on the field 
of emptiness? This is the question I have raised in the above.
Of course, in the field of emptiness, things are not merely subjective re­
presentations as idealism asserts, nor are they' merely objective beings or ex­
ternal realities independent of consciousness as realism and materialism insist. 
However independent things may be of consciousness—although this already, 
as I pointed out before, is not so simple as one might suppose—they cannot 
be independent of tubilum. No thing whatsoever can be freed from nibilum. 
They return sooner or later to nothing, so that they only exist as essentially 
non-existent and unreal, and yet they exist really and authentically precisely 
because of their being unreal. It is, moreover, in mbilum that the being of exist­
ing things can be revealed, questioned, and comprehended. The bang of 
things is comprehended by the subject that has become authentically sub-
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jectivized in mbilum, at one with the being of the subject itself. For this 
reason, no thing whatsoever can be independent of mbilum. The field of 
mbilum far transcends the field of consciousness in which the opposition 
between materialism and idealism obtains, much more so the field of empti­
ness, in which alone the abyss of mbilum can arise.
Neither the sphere of consciousness nor that of mbilum can exist apart from 
the field of emptiness. Prior to the aspect of things objectivized as external 
reality in the field of consciousness and prior to their more authentic aspect 
of being nihilized in the field of mbilum, all things are in the field of emptiness 
in their truly authentic and original aspect. In emptiness, things truly and 
ultimately abide at their own home. At the same time, prior to objective con­
sciousness grounded upon representation and prior to the perception of being 
in mbilum, the truly authentic and original knowing establishes itself in empti­
ness as the absolute this-side. It is the knowing that arises at the very place 
where it can be said that “all things advance forward and confirm the self,” or 
that “hills, rivers, the earth, plants and trees, tiles and stones, all of these are 
the self’s original part”: it can perhaps be called a kind of “knowing of un­
knowing.” Here the self is truly on its own home-ground. Where plants and 
trees are radically and simply plants and trees, where tiles and stones are tiles 
and stones through and through, and self-identically with this fact, the self 
is radically the self. This is the knowing of unknowing, a self-aw'areness which 
is none other than the field of emptiness. Let us consider this in a little more 
detail.
From ancient Greece to the present day, in the history of Western thought 
being or existence can be said to have been dealt with in most cases in terms 
of the category of substance or the category of (personal) subject. Whether 
inanimate or animate thing, human being or even God, when one takes some­
thing as a being-in-itself, its bcingness is considered usually as substance. 
The concept of substance indicates in something that which makes it be it­
self, that which makes it preserve its self-identity in spite of the incessant 
changes that occur in its more or less “accidental” properties. We must say, 
however, that we come to the concept of substance regarding something 
only because we view it from the outset as an “object,” or (from the opposite 
side) as a thing posited in front of, viewed from, and represented by the sub­
ject. This involves the paradox of representation spoken of before. It is the 
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same in the case of “life” or “soul” being considered in terms of substantiality. 
Once the circumstance that lies behind the forming of the concept of sub­
stance is brought to light, it is natural to propose, as Kant did, the basic 
position that all objects arc representations, and therefore “appearances,” 
and to interpret substance as one of the a priori pure concepts of understand­
ing, as something which the thinking activity “thinks into” (birvindtnken) 
objects. (In spite of this, the paradox of representation remains unsolved. 
Kant tries to avoid it by means of the distinction between “appearances” and 
things-in-themselves,” or phenomena and noumena.')
Such a state of affairs lurking behind the forming of the concept of sub­
stance gives rise to the idea of a “subject” as something that rejects any ob­
jective comprehension whatsoever. Although Kant, of course, marks an epoch 
in the awakening of the subject in that sense, the same awakening has made a 
remarkable advancement after him, and continued all the way to the existen­
tial subjectivity, that is, to the existence “ecstatically” thrust into nibilum. 
The subject now comes to find itself in nibilum “essentially.” It exists in such 
a way as to disclose there its own beingness. Generally, that nibilum opens up 
at the base of a being means that the field is opened up where its beingness, 
its essential mode of being, is disclosed. Thus in nibilum both things and sub­
ject return to their essential mode of being, to their ground where they are 
from the first in and of themselves.
But at the same time, their beingness itself becomes totally a question­
mark. It becomes something of which we know neither whence it comes or 
whither it goes, something essentially incomprehensible and unnameable. 
Each and every thing, no matter how familiar and acquainted it may be to the 
self, is originally a thing unknown in that basic sense. The self as a subject 
also in regard to its own origin, that is, in its “beingness” as such, is some­
thing unnamed that refuses to be determined in any way. It is what I meant 
when, speaking of the “Great Doubt,” I said that the self becomes a realization 
of the Doubt.1 When the being of things is disclosed on the plane of nibilum, it 
is disclosed as a real “doubt,” and the being of the self also appears in its origi­
nal aspect, the aspect of an enigma to the self. There, in the so-called Great
I. Eastern Buddhist Vol V, No. I, p.64.
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Doubt, things and the self revert to their essential mode of being in which 
they have been from the beginning.
The traditional ontology cannot be said to have pursued the issue of being 
to such depths. The field wherein the being itself of the questioner about 
being becomes a question-mark has never been disclosed. Traditional ontology 
has never stepped outside the merely “theoretical’' standpoint that only asks 
about “being,” a standpoint in which the questioner and the questioned are 
set apart from each other. It could not reach the place of the manifestation 
of the Great Doubt, the field where the questioner and the questioned simul­
taneously manifest themselves as a question-mark, and where there is only 
present the one great Doubt. Ontology must move through nihilism to a 
new, entirely different plane.
But if in mbilum being itself is disclosed and becomes directly a question- 
mark, the standpoint of nibilum cannot be the standpoint able to solve the 
question. It is a standpoint that merely declares the need of an inevitable 
turnabout. If in mbilum every thing reveals its original enigmatic aspect at 
one with the subject, the standpoint of mbilum must itself be transcended. 
It is in this, as I have repeatedly pointed out above, that the standpoint of 
emptiness reveals itself.
It should be obvious that in the standpoint of emptiness the being itself of 
something can no longer be said to consist in “substance” or “subject,” for 
in nihilum both become the question. But can we conceive of a mode of being 
that is neither subjective or substantial? No matter how difficult it may be to 
imagine this, the need for such a new perspective in regard to the approach to 
beingness is not to be denied. The concept of substance as well as that of sub­
ject is established after all on the field of subject-object duality; the former 
is concerned with the “object” and presupposes the “subject,” and it is the 
same with the latter, mutatis mutandis. This field of duality is broken through 
by mbilum in which, as I said above, things and the self are brought back to 
their ground; where, however, the concepts of substance and subject must 
lose their ground that is no other than the subject-object duality itself. Thus, 
in the field of mbilum, the being of things as well as of the self becomes thor­
oughly questionable by being transported to a region beyond the reach of 
“logical” thinking. It follows as a necessary consequence that with the fur­
ther turning away from mbilum, that is, within emptiness, the mode of being
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of things as well as of the self can be neither subjective nor substantial. The 
mode of being of things when they are truly on their own home-ground in 
their ultimate being-in-themselves, or in their selfness wholly beyond all 
modes of being in which they are reflected upon the subject-object relation, 
cannot be substantial, much less subjective. Equally, the mode of being of the 
self, when it is ultimately on its own home-ground and in its true selfness, can­
not be subjective, much less substantial. If so, what mode of being is being- 
in-itself in the ultimate sense—more simply, “selfness”—which is neither 
substance nor subject?
IX
Both the concepts of substance and of subject provide each in its own 
way the mode of being in which something is and remains what it is within 
constantly changing, transitory conditions. So far, we can say that substance 
and subject each refer to the mode of being-in-itself. But do they truly render 
the reality of that mode of being?
A child is making a fire in the garden. There it a fire. “Substance” indicates 
in the fire that which determines it as fire. It signifies the self-identity, the 
is-ness of the fire. What distinguishes it from the earth, the yard tools, and the 
firewood stacked nearby, the essential property of fire, the power and activity 
of burning fire, may be said to constitute fire’s substance. In it, one can 
possibly see fire’s mode of being-in-itself, its selfness.
But in this case the mode of being of fire as fire is clearly grasped in the 
aspect in which it appears to us, and hence to the extent we recognize it. Fire’s 
substance is the “form” (Wm) of fire. Here fire manifests its selfness to tu. 
This way of manifestation of a thing is its “form” and the field of “form” is 
the place where we can distinguish fire from anything else and recognize in 
combustion its essential property. Here moveover we can discern intellec­
tually or analyze scientifically the process which is called combustion, and 
thereby express what fire is, that is, its substance. If this expression is the “de­
finition” of fire, then combustion may be said to have the role of moment that 
constitutes the main content of the definition (the so-called specific differ­
ence). That its substance is thus set forth as a“logical” structure and rendered 
capable of being explained theoretically, means that it can be seen from the 
standpoint of reason. That is, although “substance” indicates fire’s selfness,
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it is so only insofar as it can be recognized through reason, in the aspect in 
which it appears to and is conceived by us.
To sum up, the field in which we comprehend a thing’s mode of being-in- 
itself as its form, the field in which the concept of substance arises, has a 
twofold character: on the one hand it is the field wherein a thing discloses 
its onm selfness, and on the other it is the field where we comprehend the 
thing’s selfness. This is a characteristic feature of the field of lofot or reason. 
Here, we must say the thing is still grasped as an object (and hencr, from the 
opposite side, from the point of view of the subject). No matter how rigorous­
ly the grasping of a thing as “substance” insists on viewing things in their 
selfness, or speaks of viewing them from within themselves, it is still a grasp­
ing on a field that unfolds so as to have reason inserted within things.
From ancient times, reason has been called the standpoint of accordance or 
identification of subject and object. The field of reason is one in which the seer 
and the seen are found basically to make a unity. This means the field of rea­
son is one in which things disclose themselves in their mode of being-in-itself. 
It also means that, different from merely subjective passions and imagina­
tion, reason’s cognition possesses objectivity. On the other hand, however, 
in spite of reason consisting of the accordance or even identification of seer 
and seen, it has time and again been observed that in this rational contemp­
lation or intellectual intuition, there still remains traces of the “two” of seer 
and seen. In other words, the objectivity of reason’s cognition implies the self­
ness of a thing is grasped, but at the same time, traces remain of its being 
viewed externally as an objective being. Such is the standpoint of reason, in 
which the selfness of a thing is apprehended as substance.
Because of this, the field of reason is not one where a thing can be on the 
home-ground of its being-in-itself. It is not the proper place in which the 
true mode of being of a thing’s selfness is established.
In order to approach the fact “that fire is,” reason always goes through the 
process of asking “v>bat fire is.” Its approach is from essential being to actual 
being. 1 think we find in Aristotle the most outstanding example of such a 
way of thinking. That fire actually bums is due to something burnable (for 
example, firewood) being burned. The actual existence of fire is supported by 
the firewood. He holds that fire’s bumability is due to the fact that the nature 
(/Ayrir) of fire is latent in the firewood. Burning, to use Aristotle’s termino-
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logy, is something that develops from latent possibility (or dynamis) to real 
actuality (or cnergcid).
But firewood cannot catch fire by itself. It is always in need of actual fire. In 
the same way, a child’s learning the alphabet and learning to read is the actual­
ization of an ability (possibility) latent in him. Indispensable for developing 
the child’s reading activity from potentiality to actuality, however, is a 
teacher who already knows how to read. A pine tree is a development of the 
nature (pAynx) latent in its seed, yet this seed in its turn is generated by a 
parent tree possessed of the same nature. Everything exists in this circular 
development between possibility and actuality. And this circular develop­
ment is ruled throughout by the essential being, the phym of the fire or the 
pine tree.
Considering essential being as the pbysis (natural essence) of a thing, Aris­
totle proceeded from essential being to actual being. Here the structure of 
being he thought to consist in “form” and “matter.” In the actuality of the 
fire, in its activity of combustion, the being itself of fire manifests itself as 
“form.” And that manifestation occurs as an emergence out of the potential­
ity latent in the combustible “matter.” To think of a development from 
potentiality to actuality is an attempt to connect “form” to “matter” and 
to look for the substrate of the former in the direction of the latter. The en­
deavor to grasp the being of things as objective beings from the standpoint 
of reason stands out in bold relief. Seen from the opposite side, the being of 
things is still grasped from the point of view of the subject. This is the same 
characteristic I pointed out before in the position that conceives of the fax­
structure of being. In fact, the dynamic view of the developmental relation of 
possibility and actuality as well as the static view of the structural relation of 
matter and form are conceived—roughly speaking, as I cannot enter into a 
detailed discussion of this problem—in accordance with the “logical” relation 
in a “theoretical” definition, that is, the relation of the concept of genus and 
the concept of species with its specific difference.
In short, it is characteristic of the standpoint of reason that the ontological 
structure-coherence in the being-in-themselves of things is perceived in the 
thinking of the subject concerned -with it as a necessary connection of its 
thought content. Therefore, we can say the standpoint of reason is an attempt 
to approach the actual being of something (that it ir) through the medium of
102
NIHILISM AND SUNYATA
its essential being (jwbat it if). This means that it is not a standpoint capable 
of directly penetrating to the precise point where something if. It is not capa­
ble of placing itself directly in the very place of a thing’s selfness, where it 
originally is and stands in itself, or where it stays at home, in its selfness. But 
is it after all possible to place oneself in such a standpoint? If it is possible, 
then what mode of being is this in a thing? What is our own mode of being 
when we take ourselves there?
X
Substance is that in which a thing preserves its self-identity; it denotes 
the selfness of a thing in the form in which its selfness is revealed to us. If so, 
what is a thing’s mode of being completely apart from its manifestation to us? 
What is its genuine mode of selfness? As was stated before, Eckhart describes 
Godhead or God’s “essence” in terms of an entirely formless, absolute “no­
thingness”; the place where God is in his own home-ground is beyond all 
forms whatsoever, in which He reveals Himself to his creatures; in parti­
cular, beyond the “personal” forms through which He reveals Himself to 
man. We are here, with respect to all that exists, including even “plants and 
trees, tiles and stones,” concerned with a similar meaning of “essence.” We 
are concerned with a mode of being in which a thing originally ir, standing on 
its own home-ground of being and preserving its own self-identity as selfness.
In my view, the key to this problem is contained within a matter that has 
been given attention in the East from ancient times, and given expression in 
such phrases as: “Fire does not bum fire,” “Water does not wash water,” 
“The eye does not see the eye.” The expression that fire does not bum fire 
refers of course to the self-identity of fire. This, however, is not the self-iden­
tity of fire as a “substance” on a standpoint from which we view it as an 
object. It is rather the self-identity of fire as “selfness” on its own home­
ground of being, that is, it is the self-identity of fire to fire itself.
In the sense that fire is something that is unable to bum fire, the phrase 
“Fire does not bum fire” speaks of the essential being of fire. Yet it also means 
that there is a fire actually burning, that here there is actually fire. That there 
is actually a fire burning vigorously means that the fire does not bum itself; 
that it is insisting on being in itself and is existing in its selfness. In the mode 
of being of fire-not-buming-itself, therefore, the fire’s essential being and
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actual being arc one. That expression indicates directly the self-identity of 
fire on its own home-ground of being.
This is fundamentally different from the case in which ‘'substance” is con­
ceived of as denoting the selfness of fire. What is described here by the word 
“self-identical” could never be “substance.” “Substance” denotes the self­
identity of a fire as recognized in its cnergtia (the being-at-work) of combus­
tion, that is, in the mode of being in which it is acting as fire, in which fire is 
actually fire. On the contrary, when we assert that fire does not bum fire, 
what is indicated is the act of fire’s not-buming, act as not-acting.
If we make a distinction for a moment between the fact that fire burns fire­
wood, and the fact that it does not bum itself, then the burning that occurs 
when the fire bums firewood show s the selfness of fire, and fire being unable 
to bum itself likewise shows its selfness. These two circumstances are here 
one and the same. As something that bums firewood, fire does not bum itself, 
as something that does not bum itself, it bums firewood. This is the true 
mode of being of fire as fire, the true self-identity of fire. Only where it docs 
not burn itself is fire truly on its own home-ground. This is not only the 
selfness of fire with regard to us, it is also fire’s selfness with regard to itself. 
That means this is completely different from a “substance” that denotes the 
self-identity of fire only in its tnergtia of combustion. If the substance of fire is 
recognized in the ewrgtia of combustion, then the fact that fire is burning only 
as something not burning itself can be truly said to show directly the self­
ness of fire. That fire does not bum itself means that fire is, at the base of its 
mode of being in suchness, not simply substantia and that its selfness differs 
from something described by the concept of substance.
As I have repeatedly said, the view has been generally held that the fact 
that a thing is itself and self-identical can be adequately described with the 
concept of substance; the view from the standpoint of reason, based upon the 
field of logos. Here the self-identity of a thing, substantia, is grasped logically 
as a “category” in the logic of being. Or rather, it is grasped from the first so 
as to be made susceptible of being logically grasped. It is in this way—the 
way basically of the traditional ontology as metaphysics—that we usually 
think of a thing’s self-identity, of the fact that something is itself.
But the true mode of being of a thing-in-itself, its self-identity in the sense 
of “selfness” described above, differs so radically from self-identity in the sense
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of substance, that it implies a thorough negation of the latter conception and 
with it a turnabout of the standpoint of reason and all its logical thinking. 
For instance, against the view which in a fire takes notice solely of the aspect 
of its work of combustion (its rwrgrw) and recognizes in it the self-identity 
of fire, whereby it is actually fire and whereby there is actually fire, the selfness 
of fire, as was expressed by “fire docs not bum fire,” must demand a totally 
different view that can also connote that aspect in which the complete nega­
tion of the substantial self-identity manifests itself. If we suppose within the 
potency and activity of burning the pbysis (natural essence), or in Buddhist 
terminology the so-called jishd (self-nature), of fire, the selfness of fire must 
be said to lie in its so-called mu-jisbo (no-self-nature). While the concept of 
substance grasps the selfncss of a fire merely in its own fire-nature (hence as 
being), its true selfness is “no fire-nature.” The selfness of fire lies in non-bum- 
ing. Of course, this non-burning cannot exist apart from burning. Fire is non­
burning right in its burning. The point is, however, that the burning cannot 
in fact be conceived of without its non-burning, i.e. as long as the perspective 
of fire’s not burning itself remains unopened. That a fire is sustaining itself 
in burning proves that it does not bum itself. Essentially, non-combustion is 
the ground of combustion. Because of non-combustion, combustion is com­
bustion. The mu-jishd of a fire is its home-ground of being. So also with 
water. Water washes something because it does not wash itself.
For this reason, we must say that the self-identity of a fire being a fire can­
not be conceived of apart from its non-burning. “Fire-nature” is real as such 
only as the fire-nature of no fire-nature. Fire’s genuine self-identity lies not 
in a substantia or jishd conceptualized from its aspect of combustion, but rather 
arises only in the turnabout of that viewpoint, in the appearance of the aspect 
of non-combustion. Stated more concretely, genuine self-identity consists in 
the self-identity between that substantial self-identity (as being) and its abso­
lute negation. Our usual utterance at the sight of a fire, that “this is fire,” is 
mostly not true: that is, so long as the utterance is made from the position 
which recognizes the fire only in the aspect of burning. Since the real truth 
begins from negating such a position, we can even say that the utterance, “this 
is not fire,” is nearer the truth. Only on the plane where this becomes possible 
is “this is fire” established as truth. “This is not fire, therefore it is fire”—to 
use the formula set forth in the Diamond Sutra—is the truth of “this is fire,” the
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authentic way of directly denoting fire’s selfness and of expressing the true 
reality of fire.
If all this sounds strange, it is only because we ordinarily place ourselves 
on the position of reason, in the word’s broad sense, not merely in our every­
day life but also in science and even in philosophy, and judge and view things 
(though on each field in a different way) from there where we do not touch 
the reality of things. We can touch their reality only on a field absolutely dif­
ferent and absolutely transcendent from judgements and views based upon 
reason. It is the field of a thing’s selfncss described above, the field of a thing’s 
self-identity fro seifsum and not fro nobis. And since this field is absolutely 
different from the standpoint of everyday life, of science, or philosophical 
thinking, the self-identity of a thing on this field—for instance, the stubborn 
fact that this is fire—can be truly expressed paradoxically as, “this is not fire, 
therefore it is fire.”
This absolutely transcendent field is none other than the field of “empti­
ness” which, as described previously, opens itself ultimately at this-side, and 
is the absolute this-side.
However, an adequate explication of the position of emptiness is possible 
when we take into consideration not only the concept of substance but also 
that of personal subject. Only then will we be able to pursue radically the 
problems I have brought up in the above; the problem of personality and 
materiality, and also the problem of the modes of being of a thing and of a self, 
when it is said that "all things advance forward and practice and confirm the 
self,” or that “hills and rivers, the earth, plants and trees, tiles and stones, 
all are the self’s own original part.”2
2. Ibid., p. 69.
Translated by Yamamoto Seisaku
106
